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COMMENT 
SCALING THE WALL AND RUNNING THE MILE:  THE  
ROLE OF PHYSICAL-SELECTION PROCEDURES  
IN THE DISPARATE IMPACT NARRATIVE 
Yiyang Wu† 
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson 
in 1977, gender-based disparate impact litigation has been limited in scope, but 
there remains room for growth.  This Comment focuses on one particularly suc-
cessful subset of gender-based disparate impact cases, physical-selection proce-
dures.  An examination of these decisions shows that plaintiffs have faced an 
uphill battle in combating unfounded assumptions, both in establishing a prima 
facie case as well as in rebutting the affirmative defense.  Indeed, some lower 
courts have relied on arguments that are inconsistent with the Supreme Court case 
law as it has progressed since Griggs v. Duke Power Co.   
At the same time, the success of physical-selection procedure cases offers hope 
for expansion going forward.  By contextualizing an industry’s practices, referring 
to narratives of female applicants, and providing examples of reasonable alterna-
tives, advocates have succeeded in positively framing their arguments in a man-
ner that factfinders are likely to welcome.  In doing so, advocates can help reclaim 
the ideals of Title VII and the disparate impact movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
† Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 160.  J.D. Candidate, 
2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 2007, Harvard University.  I would 
like to thank Professor Serena Mayeri for her invaluable insights in developing this 
Comment.  I owe additional gratitude to the editors and board of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review.  Finally, I am grateful for the support of my family and Benjamin 
Cheng, my soon-to-be family. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The merits and potential of disparate impact theory have been en-
thusiastically championed and critically debated1 since its Supreme 
 
1 See, e.g., Lara M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace:  Requiring 
Employer Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 280 (2002) 
(contending that disparate impact theory could be used to “make a prima facie show-
ing of discrimination based on sex” for employers’ failure to accommodate breastfeed-
ing women in the workplace); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 341-73 (2003) (proposing the use of disparate impact 
theory to equalize women’s access to telecommuting options); see also Reva Siegel, Why 
Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1145 (1997) (arguing that disparate impact theory litigation could 
“move the nation closer to disestablishing . . . gender stratification than current consti-
tutional doctrines now do”). 
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Court inception in 1971.2  Indeed, the Court’s most recent decision, 
Ricci v. DeStefano, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of 
an employer’s reaction to allegations of a disparate impact on African 
American candidates as a result of written promotion exams,3 has rein-
vigorated the discourse but provided few answers.  Most of the disparate 
impact debate  after Ricci has understandably centered on the future of 
race-based claims.4  Professors Mario Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, and 
Trina Jones, for example, have argued that the Ricci decision signaled 
the Court’s intent to enter a realm of “post-race equal protection.”5  Yet 
this race-focused discourse obfuscates the fact that female disparate 
impact claimants face disparities at least as dramatic as those faced by 
African American claimants.  And almost no attention has been paid  
after Ricci to how gender-based disparate impact cases have fared or 
what the doctrine’s future prospects are for success.6  
In this Comment, I focus on one increasingly prevalent subset of 
gender-based disparate impact litigation:  physical-selection procedure 
cases.  Physical-selection procedure litigation typically features female 
plaintiffs who challenge the use of certain employer-instituted tests, 
such as wall climbs and timed mile runs, which act as barriers to female 
entry into traditionally male-dominated jobs.  In deciding these cases, 
courts tend to rely on a number of unfounded assumptions, particularly 
with regard to the relationship between strength and safety, and make 
 
2 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under the [Civil Rights] 
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of 
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discrim-
inatory employment practices.”).   
3 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).  For a discussion of the Ricci opinion and its impli-
cations for disparate impact litigation, see infra notes 41-49. 
4 See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Pro-
tection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 994-95 (2010) (concluding that after Ricci, civil rights advo-
cates “may have to defend [race-based] disparate impact claims from eradication”); 
Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 2181, 2183 (2010) (arguing that Ricci “hints at a sweeping new affirmative 
defense for unintentional, disparate-impact claims brought under Title VII”); Michael 
J. Zimmer, Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society:  A Case of Unintended 
Consequences?, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257, 1307 (reasoning that “the ease with which [the 
Court] found disparate treatment may have the ironic effect of opening new avenues 
for civil rights advocates to more easily and therefore more successfully bring disparate 
treatment actions”).   
5 Barnes, Chemerinsky, & Jones, supra note 4, at 994-95.  
6 To my knowledge, no literature has yet explored how Ricci has affected gender-
based disparate impact claims.  For one example of a district court’s attempt to decide 
a gender-based disparate impact claim after Ricci, see United States v. Massachusetts, 
781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4, 11-21 (D. Mass. 2011). 
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assertions that are inconsistent with disparate impact theory as articu-
lated in Supreme Court opinions from Griggs v. Duke Power Co.7 onward.  
However, plaintiffs who confront these flawed assumptions have been 
able to achieve success in a number of lower courts.8  In this Comment, 
I identify the roadblocks commonly facing physical-selection procedure 
claims and suggest best practices that might enable claimants to over-
come them. 
Part I of this Comment describes the standard (mostly race-based) 
disparate impact doctrine as it has evolved since Griggs.9  Part II exam-
ines the gender-based disparate impact movement, demonstrating that 
its expansion beyond height and weight requirements has, for the 
most part, been limited.  In marked contrast, litigation surrounding 
physical-selection procedures has had atypical success in lower courts.  
Parts III and IV focus on lower court decisions in physical-selection 
procedure cases and identify patterns that help to explain why certain 
plaintiffs succeed where others fail.  I argue that successful plaintiffs 
have been able to bypass certain common obstacles, including argu-
ments that females must train for their examinations and arguments 
that physical-selection procedures are a business necessity.  In unsuc-
cessful physical-selection procedure cases, courts have misinterpreted 
Supreme Court precedent and relied instead on unproven assump-
tions that ignore the reality of the employer’s actual needs.   
I conclude in Part IV with suggestions that may enable future 
gender-based disparate impact advocates to find greater success.  Advo-
cates should first contextualize the industry and the particular employ-
ment practice.  Second, advocates should attempt to humanize the 
consequences of these questionable practices and misguided assump-
tions by referring to the specific narratives of applicants.  Third, advo-
cates should provide concrete examples of reasonable alternatives to the 
challenged procedure.  Finally, advocates should consistently ground 
their arguments in the disparate impact theory as put forth in Griggs.  In 
doing so, advocates will further not only the progress of gender-based 
causes but also the disparate impact movement at large. 
 
7 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  For discussion of the Griggs case, see infra Section I.A. 
8 For a list of these cases, see infra note 82. 
9 The majority of this narration focuses on race-based disparate impact doctrine for 
one simple reason:  the Court has granted certiorari almost exclusively in race-based 
disparate impact cases. 
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I.  THE STANDARD DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE 
To understand the current state of disparate impact litigation, it is 
important to trace its historical roots from its inception.  By examining 
Title VII of the Civil Right Acts of 1964,10 the Griggs progeny,11 and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991,12 I aim to make two points:  first, the Court 
intended disparate impact litigation to serve as a counterpart to dis-
parate treatment cases;13 second, the Court’s analysis of disparate im-
pact theory has overwhelmingly focused on race-based claims.  Thus, a 
separate analysis of gender-based disparate impact case law is needed. 
A.  Griggs and Its Progeny 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court held that Title VII 
prohibits neutral employment policies that have a disparate impact on 
African American plaintiffs without a business necessity justification.14  
In Griggs, a power plant required its employees to pass two screening 
 
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006). 
11 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674-77 (2009) (discussing the Title 
VII implications of an employer’s discarding a promotion examination before a court 
finds that the test resulted in a disparate impact); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 
490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989) (clarifying the required components of the business neces-
sity defense), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that subjec-
tive employment decisions are covered by the disparate impact doctrine); Connecticut 
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-56 (1982) (rejecting the “bottom line” theory of equality—
which posits that an employer can make up for discrimination by hiring or promoting a 
sufficient number of people from the targeted group—as a defense to Title VII liability); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977) (finding that disparate impact 
claims are proper for gender discrimination); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 413, 425-36 (1975) (clarifying the standard of proof for the “‘job relatedness’ of 
pre-employment tests” in disparate impact litigation). 
12 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
2, 16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
13 Title VII prohibits two forms of employment discrimination:  disparate impact 
and disparate treatment.  For the differences between disparate impact and disparate 
treatment discrimination, see Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Dis-
parate Treatment:  Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 98-117 
(2006).  In comparison to disparate impact, disparate treatment is “often thought to 
reflect most directly the text of Title VII, which prohibits an employer from taking an 
adverse action against an employee ‘because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.’”  Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2185 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1)).  The “key” to proving disparate treatment discrimination lies in show-
ing an employer’s intent to discriminate.  Id. at 2186.   
14 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).   
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tests and have a high school diploma in order to obtain a position out-
side of the labor department.15  The plaintiffs were able to demonstrate 
that this policy had a disproportionately adverse impact on African 
Americans.16  The Court held that the “absence of discriminatory intent 
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that 
operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to 
measuring job capability.”17  Because the power plant could not show 
that the test served an overriding business necessity, the Court ultimately 
held that the employer’s selection procedures violated Title VII.18 
Relying upon the general language in Griggs, the Court decided 
several disparate impact cases clarifying the doctrine in a decidedly 
pro-plaintiff manner.  In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court held 
that an employer, in order to comply with Title VII, must demonstrate 
by “professionally acceptable methods” that its discriminatory tests are 
“predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of 
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job.”19  Although 
the employer in Albemarle, perhaps taking a lesson from its counterpart 
in Griggs, had conducted a half-day study to prove that its general ability 
tests were correlated with job performance, the Court noted that the 
study results were not statistically significant, were highly subjective, 
and involved an unrepresentative sample group.20  The Court also cre-
ated a surrebuttal to the Griggs framework, holding that plaintiffs 
could defeat the business necessity defense by showing “that other tests 
 
15 Id. at 427-28. 
16 Id. at 431-33, 436.  While the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs were more 
likely to fail aptitude tests because they had received “inferior education in segregated 
schools,” id. at 430, such a “present effects of past discrimination” argument has been 
criticized by at least one scholar.  See Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of 
Discrimination:  Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 804 (1985) (“Under this [past 
discrimination] theory, . . . a disparate impact opens the door to litigation over ancient, 
but preserved, race-based discrimination.”). 
17 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
18 See id. at 431 (“[N]either the high school completion requirement nor the gen-
eral intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful perfor-
mance of the jobs for which it was used.”). 
19 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1974)); see also Linda Lye, 
Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale:  The Erosion and Confusion of Disparate Impact and the 
Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 324 (1998) (arguing that the 
Albemarle Court “considerably strengthened the disparate impact plaintiff’s hand”). 
20 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 429-35. 
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or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would 
also serve the employer’s legitimate interest.”21 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, which prohibited height and weight re-
quirements for employment within prison systems that “had a discrimi-
natory impact on women applicants,”22 is the only case in which the 
Court has ever considered the merits of a gender-based disparate im-
pact claim.  The Court in Dothard set forth the following business ne-
cessity test:  first, a defendant must articulate a quality “essential to 
effective job performance,” and second, it must prove that the chal-
lenged practice accurately assesses that quality.23  The Court also ex-
plicitly held that an employer could be liable for using tests that had a 
disparate impact across gender lines.24  However, as I argue in Section 
II.A, the Court failed to take advantage of the opportunity Dothard pre-
sented to strengthen the gender-based disparate impact doctrine. 
The next set of decisions, Connecticut v. Teal and Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, contributed rules to the emerging doctrine but 
also made moves toward fashioning a more limited cause of action.  In 
Teal, the employer attempted to compensate for a discriminatory se-
lection procedure by promoting African Americans and ensuring that 
the overall result of the process would be an “appropriate racial bal-
ance.”25  The Court rejected the employer’s contention that its bottom-
line result could be a complete defense to a disparate impact claim 
and required that each specific procedure undergo analysis.26  Yet by 
 
21 Id. at 425.  Notably, the Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio attempted to alter 
this standard by holding that courts should defer to the employer’s judgment on the ef-
fectiveness of such alternative practices.  See 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (“[T]he judiciary 
should proceed with care before mandating that an employer must adopt a plaintiff’s 
alternative selection or hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit.”), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Ray-
theon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).  However, Congress expressed its discon-
tent with the Wards Cove approach by expressly overruling it in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 and codifying the business necessity defense as it existed prior to Wards Cove.  Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2006)).  
22 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).  Because Part II examines Dothard in greater detail, the 
description of the case here only addresses that which is relevant to a general overview 
of the disparate impact doctrine. 
23 Id. at 331-32; see also id. at 332 (“If the job-related quality that the [employers] 
identify is bona fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test 
for applicants that measures strength directly.”).   
24 See id. at 328-29 (stating that the standard for examining a gender-based disparate 
impact claim is the same as that used in Griggs and Albemarle to assess race-based claims). 
25 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442-45 (1982). 
26 Id. at 442, 452-56. 
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directing its analysis to discrete elements of the employer’s procedure, 
the Court’s decision foreshadowed its later efforts to limit disparate 
impact claims to those in which a specific practice is proved to have 
caused the alleged wrong.27   
In Watson, the Court ruled that subjective evaluation processes, 
such as interviews, also fall under the purview of the disparate impact 
doctrine.28  However, the Court also limited the doctrine’s potential 
for effectuating change by increasing the plaintiff’s burden in making 
a prima facie case and reducing the defendant’s burden for proving a 
business necessity defense.29  Taken together, these cases represent a 
shift in the Court’s posture from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant—a 
shift that culminated in Wards Cove and prompted Congress to step in 
and limit these cases’ impact. 
B.  Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
The Court strengthened its pro-defendant posture in Teal and Wat-
son even further in Wards Cove, and, in so doing, triggered a congres-
sional response in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The facts 
underlying the plaintiffs’ case in Wards Cove were similar to previous 
Title VII cases:  a group of cannery workers alleged that a combination 
of hiring and promotion practices had resulted in a disparate impact 
against minorities.30  However, for the first time in a disparate impact 
case, the Court decided in favor of the employer-defendant.31  In find-
ing for the employer, the Court held that the workers’ prima facie case 
had to identify a specific employment practice that caused the dispar-
 
27 Lye, supra note 19, at 329-30. 
28 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988) (“If an em-
ployer’s undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same ef-
fects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to 
see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply.”). 
29 See id. at 994, 998 (holding that a plaintiff must pinpoint a “specific employment 
practice” that results in a disparate impact, while a defendant need only show some 
relationship between its employment selection criteria and the job itself, not “particular 
criteria [that] predict on-the-job performance”). 
30 490 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 
(2003).  Some of the alleged discriminatory employment practices were “nepotism, a 
rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, [and] separate hiring channels.”  
Id. at 647. 
31 Id. at 655, 661. 
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ate impact.32  In addition, the Court established a relaxed affirmative 
defense standard:  an employer has an affirmative defense as long as it 
establishes that the practice is reasonably related to the employer’s busi-
ness justification.33  As the Court emphasized, “[T]here is no require-
ment that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to 
the employer’s business for it to pass muster.”34   
At least partially as a response to Wards Cove, the 102nd Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.35  For the first time, Congress pro-
vided an explicit statutory basis for disparate impact litigation, stating 
in no uncertain terms that disparate impact claims have a legitimate 
place within Title VII.36  The Act confirmed that a plaintiff’s prima  
facie burden includes establishing that a specific employment practice, 
or group of employment practices, caused a disparate impact on a pro-
tected class.37  At the same time, the Act also rejected the “reasoned 
review” standard for an employer’s business necessity established in 
Wards Cove.38  The Act declared that Wards Cove had “weakened the 
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.”39  
Congress’s insistence on a pre–Wards Cove interpretation of dis-
parate impact helped establish the legitimacy of the modern disparate 
impact doctrine and provided advocates a substantive analytical 
 
32 See id. at 657 (“As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the ap-
plication of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate 
impact under attack.”). 
33 See id. at 659 (“The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employ-
er’s justification for his use of the challenged practice.”). 
34 Id. 
35 See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Im-
pact Cause of Action:  Finding The Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1996) (“The 
Act . . . purports to restore the law regarding business necessity to its state before Wards 
Cove.”). 
36 Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2194. 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (“An unlawful employment practice based 
on disparate impact is established . . . [if] a complaining party demonstrates that a re-
spondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and con-
sistent with business necessity . . . .”). 
38 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 
(stating that one of the Act’s purposes was “to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ 
and ‘job related’ enunciated . . . [in] Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove”). 
39 Id. § 2(2). 
Wu FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/11/2012 12:55 PM 
1204 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1195 
 
framework with which to make their cases.40  The Supreme Court did 
not address the disparate impact doctrine again until 2009. 
C.  Ricci v. DeStefano:  An Update on the Disparate Impact Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano and the implica-
tions it holds for disparate impact litigation, affirmative action, and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have generated 
a lively academic discussion.41  In Ricci, a group of white and Hispanic 
firefighters sued the City of New Haven because it refused to certify the 
results of a promotional exam; the firefighters argued that the failure to 
certify violated Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.42  The City, 
though, maintained that it had refused to certify the exam results be-
cause such a certification would have had a disparate impact on minori-
ty firefighters and thus exposed the City to Title VII liability.43   
The Supreme Court held that an employer is liable under Title VII 
if it overturns promotion test results because of race unless the employ-
er can demonstrate that it has a strong evidentiary basis that doing so 
would cause it to lose a disparate impact lawsuit.44  The Court concluded 
that the City had not demonstrated a sufficient basis in evidence to 
show that it would be liable to the unsuccessful test takers in a disparate 
impact suit had it certified the test results.45 
The implications of Ricci for the disparate impact doctrine have yet 
to be seen; predictions have ranged from hopelessly bleak to cautiously 
optimistic.  Professor Richard Primus has summarized three possible 
interpretations of the Ricci holding.  First, it may mean that the “ac-
tions necessary to remedy a disparate impact violation are per se in 
 
40 See Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2194 (“With the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, . . . disparate impact finally gained the clear analytic framework it had 
lacked since its inception in Griggs.”). 
41 See sources cited supra note 4. 
42 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 2676-77.  In articulating its reasoning for the holding, the Court explained:   
But once . . . [a testing] process has been established . . . [employers] may not 
then invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee’s legitimate expecta-
tion not to be judged on the basis of race.  Doing so, absent a strong basis in evi-
dence of an impermissible disparate impact, amounts to the sort of racial 
preference that Congress has disclaimed and is antithetical to the notion of a 
workplace where individuals are guaranteed equal opportunity regardless of race. 
Id. at 2677 (citation omitted). 
45 Id. 
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conceptual conflict with the demands of disparate treatment doctrine 
(and, implicitly, the demands of equal protection),” sounding the 
death knell for disparate impact causes of action.46  Second, Ricci may 
be distinguished institutionally, because “public employers, unlike 
courts, are not authorized to engage in the race-conscious decision-
making that disparate impact remedies entail.”47  Third, Ricci may sig-
nify that in situations which produce “visible victims”—the white and 
Hispanic firefighters—the remedy is not proper.48  Because “the stand-
ard judicial remedies all avoid creating [such] visible victims,” this last 
reading allows Title VII’s disparate impact standard to survive future 
constitutional attack.49 
Notwithstanding the disagreement surrounding disparate impact 
remedies after Ricci, the steps involved in disparate impact litigation 
remain—as of yet—unchanged.50  First, the plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant engaged in a practice that had an adverse impact on a 
protected class.51  Upon the plaintiff’s sufficient pleading of a prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the disparate 
 
46 Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344 
(2010).  Professor Primus cites Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Ricci and an article by 
Ronald Dworkin as two primary examples of this interpretation.  Id. 
47 Id. at 1344-45. 
48 Id. at 1345. 
49 Id.; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano:  End of the Line or Just Another 
Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2010) (“Reports of the 
death of Title VII’s disparate impact theory of discrimination in the wake of Ricci v. DeSte-
fano may be exaggerated.”).  But see Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci:  Struggling 
Against the “Built-In Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 262 
(2011) (arguing that Ricci “may well have done as much to eviscerate disparate impact’s 
potential as Wards Cove did twenty years earlier”); Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 
2205-09 (contending that certain interpretations of Ricci, in particular the one that allows 
for a new affirmative defense, would impose significant barriers to plaintiffs attempting to 
establish disparate impact liability). 
50 However, the standards governing the business necessity defense may also be af-
fected by Ricci.  Most recently, in Easterling v. Connecticut, a federal district court sug-
gested that the standard for establishing business necessity in disparate impact cases 
after Ricci is a “Significantly Correlated Standard”—that is, “a hiring practice is job re-
lated if the practice is significantly correlated with elements of work behavior that are 
relevant to the job.”  783 F. Supp. 2d 323, 335 (D. Conn. 2011). 
There may also be an additional affirmative defense based on a defendant’s aware-
ness of a disparate impact at the time of the alleged discriminatory action.  See infra note 
96; see also United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 n.3 (D. Mass. 2011) (men-
tioning such a potential defense but declining to evaluate its merits).    
51 See, e.g., Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630 
F.2d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that “the common mode of Title VII analysis” re-
quires that the plaintiff first “establish a prima facie case on the basis of disparate impact”).  
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impact by establishing a business necessity defense.52  The defendant 
must demonstrate both that the selection procedure adequately tests a 
certain skill and that this skill is sufficiently necessary to perform the 
job.53  Even if the defendant proves a legitimate business necessity, the 
plaintiff may still prevail if she is able to propose an alternative prac-
tice that would still provide for the employer’s legitimate business 
needs but without the disparate impact.54 
In theory, these steps apply just as easily to selection procedures 
based on physical tests (which tend to implicate gender concerns) as 
they do to procedures based on written tests (which tend to implicate 
race).  Yet the fact patterns in race and gender cases seem intuitively 
different, and in light of the different standards brought to bear in the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,55 it is worth pausing for a 
 
52 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he defendant is required to rebut the plaintiff’s case by proving 
that the disparity results from legitimate, job-related selection procedures.”).   
53 See supra text accompanying note 19; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 432 (1971) (holding that the employer practice or policy in question must have a 
“manifest relationship” to the employee’s job duties).  Indeed, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued guidelines to direct courts’ analysis of the 
business necessity defense.  The defense, under the guidelines, requires that employ-
ers’ discriminatory tests be validated by either (1) content-validity, (2) criterion-validity, 
or (3) construct-validity studies.  29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (2011).  Content validity can be 
established by producing “data showing that the content of the selection procedure is 
representative of important aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates 
are to be evaluated.”  Id. § 1607.5(B).  Criterion validity can be established by produc-
ing “empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or sig-
nificantly correlated with important elements of job performance.”  Id.  Construct 
validity, meanwhile, can be established by producing “data showing that the [employ-
ment] procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable character-
istics which have been determined to be important in successful performance in the 
job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.”  Id. 
54 See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (“If an employer 
does . . . meet the burden of proving that its tests are ‘job related,’ it remains open to 
the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest . . . .”). 
55 Courts apply intermediate scrutiny to analyze gender-based classifications under 
the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-200, 204 (1976) 
(using intermediate scrutiny to strike down a statute that prohibited the sale of beer to 
males under the age of twenty-one, while restricting sale to females under the age of 
eighteen).  In contrast, courts analyze race-based classifications under a more rigorous 
standard of judicial review.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 
227 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications—invidious or benign—imposed by the 
federal government are subject to strict scrutiny).  While traditional disparate impact 
analysis does not implicate constitutional concerns because it is a statutory cause of ac-
tion, Ricci has demonstrated that invalidating test results due to perceived disparate im-
pact liability can, in some instances, trigger equal protection concerns.  See supra notes 
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moment to consider gender-specific disparate impact case law.  Part II 
explains the gender-based disparate impact doctrine as it has devel-
oped in the Supreme Court and in lower courts and seeks to provide a 
backdrop against which to consider the smaller subset of cases—those 
involving physical-selection procedures—that are examined in Part III. 
II.  THE GENDER-BASED DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE 
The disparate impact doctrine applies to any employee who has 
been discriminated against “because of” or “on the basis of” that per-
son’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”56  It is quite logical, 
then, for advocates championing the expansion of the gender-based 
disparate impact doctrine to turn to Supreme Court jurisprudence 
defining disparate impact generally.  However, the Supreme Court has 
overwhelmingly shaped this doctrine in response to race-based cases.  
This Part focuses on Dothard v. Rawlinson57 and its effects on gender-
based disparate impact litigation in the lower courts. 
A.  Dothard v. Rawlinson:  Limits to Its Strengths 
Any narrative of the gender-based disparate impact doctrine must 
begin with Dothard v. Rawlinson, the only gender-based disparate impact 
case considered by the Supreme Court to date.  In Dothard, Dianne 
Rawlinson applied to work as a correctional counselor with the Ala-
bama Board of Corrections but was rejected because she did not meet 
Alabama’s statutorily imposed 120-pound weight requirement.58  Plain-
 
41-49 and accompanying text.  Because the Ricci holding has not been fully developed 
with respect to race-based disparate impact cases, much less gender-based cases, this 
Comment does not seek to apply equal protection constrictions to gender-based dispar-
ate impact claims. 
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(c) (2006).  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amends 
Title VII such that the phrases “because of” and “on the basis of sex” encompass behav-
ior that is “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions.”  Id. § 2000e-2(k). 
57 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
58 Id. at 323-24.  Rawlinson also challenged the legality of the Board’s Administrative 
Regulation 204, which “establish[ed] gender criteria for assigning correctional counselors 
to ‘contact positions’” in maximum-security facilities.  Id. at 324-26.  Such positions in-
volved “continual close physical proximity to inmates.”  Id. at 325.  While the Court found 
that Regulation 204 “explicitly discriminate[d] against women on the basis of their sex,” it 
upheld the regulation because “being male is . . . a bona fide occupational qualification 
for the job of correctional counselor in a ‘contact’ position.”  Id. at 332-37.  This Com-
ment will not address the bona fide occupational qualification defense to Regulation 204 
asserted by the defendants and accepted by the majority, but it is noteworthy that Justice 
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tiffs submitted evidence that Alabama’s height and weight thresholds 
combined to exclude over forty percent of the nationwide female 
population but less than one percent of the male population.59  The 
Court held that this evidence was sufficient to establish that the re-
quirements had a disparate impact on female applicants.60 
Asserting the business necessity defense, the defendants argued 
that the height and weight requirements were related to strength.  
Strength, they argued, was “essential to effective job performance” as a 
prison guard.61  The Court rejected this argument because the defend-
ants did not provide appropriate evidentiary support for what “amount 
of strength” a guard needed to perform effectively or what height or 
weight would ensure that a guard possessed the requisite strength.62  
The Court criticized the defendants for failing “to offer evidence of 
any kind in specific justification of the statutory standards” and conse-
quently refused to sustain a business necessity defense.63  
But, by dismissing this defense on the technical grounds that no 
statistical analysis was undertaken, the Court did not engage in further 
analysis of the defendants’ claims.  Instead, the Court stated simply 
that “[i]f the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona 
fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test 
for applicants that measures strength directly.”64  In so doing, the 
Court bypassed ruling on the merits of the defendants’ underlying ar-
gument of whether strength is an appropriate measure by which to 
gauge job ability.   
More specifically, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the 
disparate impact doctrine does not allow all strength measures to pass 
the business necessity test in all situations. In Dothard, the Court pre-
sumed that Dianne Rawlinson, who physically dealt with prisoners on a 
daily basis, needed to meet a minimum threshold of strength in order 
to adequately perform her job duties.  While this assumption was 
 
Marshall’s dissent eloquently demonstrates that the majority’s reasoning “regrettably per-
petuates one of the most insidious of the old myths about women—that women, wittingly 
or not, are seductive sexual objects.”  Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 329-30 (majority opinion).  While the defendants argued that the Court 
should consider statistics based on actual applicants to the positions in question, the 
Court accepted the plaintiffs’ nationwide population.  Id. at 330-31. 
60 Id. at 331. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 331-32. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 332. 
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probably true in that particular case, it is not necessarily true in all 
gender-related disparate impact cases.  Consider, at the extremes, a 
strength requirement for a high school English teacher,65 or a test re-
quiring a minimum number of pushups for a job that involves long-
distance walking.66  Such tests should fail—the former because the 
English teacher does not need physical strength to perform his job 
(lack of relationship between the skill and the job), and the latter be-
cause pushups are not the appropriate method with which to measure 
aerobics (lack of relationship between the test and the required skill).   
On a fundamental level, the disparate impact doctrine requires ev-
idence of a clear correlation between the skill and the test (demon-
strated by the English teacher example), and the test and the job 
(demonstrated by the pushup example).67  If the Dothard Court had 
stated that employers must statistically demonstrate that strength and 
other broadly defined traits were related to the job at hand, and that the 
test adequately reflected that trait, the Court could have then shown 
how the employers in the case had (or had not) established these dual 
requirements.  Instead, the Court’s presumptive silence on this matter 
has led to confusion in lower courts’ analyses of physical-selection pro-
cedure cases and has in this way stymied Dothard’s potential.68 
Dothard’s impact, as stated in later cases, has by and large been lim-
ited to three specific propositions:  (1) gender is included in Title VII’s 
enumerated list of protected classes, and the same disparate impact 
standards used for race should also apply to gender-based disparate 
 
65 Two race-related corollaries might be the literary tests in Albemarle and the gen-
eral intelligence test in Griggs.  In both cases, the Court held that the tests did not ade-
quately correspond to the job duties of low-level workers at paper mills and coal plants, 
respectively.  See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431-32 (1975); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
66 Cf. Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-22 (S.D. Ohio 1986) 
(concluding that a ladder-climbing test was a poor indicator of endurance and agility, 
both of which were important when evaluating necessary skills in potential firefighters), 
rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993). 
67 See supra notes 19, 53 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Massachu-
setts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The first part of the analysis, business ne-
cessity, ‘inquires whether the job criteria arise out of a manifest business need.’ . . . The 
second part of the analysis, relatedness, ‘inquires whether there is a [statistically proven] 
correlation between the criteria used and successful job performance.’” (quoting Graf-
fam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Me. 1994))). 
68 See infra Section III.C. 
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impact claims;69 (2) data from the actual applicant pool in question is 
not always necessary to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact;70 
and (3) height and weight restrictions cannot by themselves establish a 
business necessity sufficient to rebut a disparate impact claim.71  While 
these holdings have undoubtedly “strengthened the position of dispar-
ate impact plaintiffs,”72 disparate impact has not had nearly as much 
effect on dismantling gender stratification as advocates had once so 
forcefully predicted.73   
B.  Gender-Based Disparate Impact in Lower Federal  
and State Courts After Dothard 
Gender-based disparate impact cases have had limited success since 
Dothard.  To be sure, a number of height and weight restrictions—
similar to those in Dothard—have been struck down by lower courts.74  
Yet novel claims outside of the traditional testing, patronage, and 
promotion cases remain “few and far between.”75  For example, “no-
 
69 See, e.g., Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1977) (ex-
plaining that in Dothard “the Supreme Court expressly extended Griggs to a case of sex-
ual discrimination”).  
70 See, e.g., Berkman v. City of New York (Berkman II), 705 F.2d 584, 594 (2d Cir. 
1983) (“Those who have been deterred by a discriminatory practice from applying for 
employment are as much victims of discrimination as are actual applicants whom the 
practice has caused to be rejected.”); LeBoeuf v. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747, 756 (D. 
Mass. 1980) (using Dothard to support the assertion that “[g]eneralized national statis-
tics, such as those offered by plaintiff here, will suffice to make out a prima facie case of 
violation of Title VII”), rev’d sub nom. Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1982). 
This Comment references numerous decisions from the Berkman v. City of New York 
litigation, which involved a Title VII disparate impact claim by female firefighter appli-
cants against the New York City Fire Department in the 1980s.  One Eastern District of 
New York opinion (Berkman I) and two Second Circuit opinions (Berkman II and Berk-
man IV) will be discussed.   
71 See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1005 (1988) (“[A]bsent 
proof that height and weight requirements directly correlate[] with amount of strength 
deemed ‘essential to good job performance,’ [such] requirements [are] not justified as 
business necessity.” (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977))). 
72 Lye, supra note 19, at 326. 
73 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
74 See, e.g., EEOC v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 743 F.2d 739, 741-43 (10th Cir. 1984) (find-
ing that a height requirement for the position of switchman-brakeman discriminated 
against women); Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765, 769 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that height requirements illegally discriminated against female police officer applicants); 
Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1381-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting a minimum 
height requirement for applicants to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)). 
75 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 
742-43 (2006).  Professor Selmi’s research, which addresses all disparate impact claims, 
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spouse” restrictions prohibiting spouses from working together have 
on occasion been statistically proven to have an adverse impact on 
women.76  However, such findings of disparate impact have rarely re-
sulted in employer liability.  As of 2006, only one federal court of appeals 
had found a no-spouse claim viable under disparate impact theory.77  
Even pregnancy leave claims, once championed by feminist advo-
cates,78 have found only limited success in the courts.79  As Professor 
Joanna Grossman recently opined, “The reality is that plaintiffs almost 
 
and not just gender-related suits, also points to a significant overall decline in the success 
rate of disparate impact litigation since 1985.  Id. at 738.  
76 See, e.g., EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing that a no-spouse rule had a disparate impact upon women and was not “justified by 
business necessity”); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(determining that the no-spouse rule had a “substantial discriminatory impact,” as evi-
denced by the fact that “seventy-one of the last seventy-four people disqualified under it 
were women”).  But see Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 
1987) (finding that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that an airline 
company’s no-spouse restriction had a disparate impact on women); Harper v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412-14 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that the employee 
failed to prove that a no-spouse policy adversely affected women).  
Notably, married women have brought the “vast majority” of suits challenging no-
spouse policies, thus “mak[ing it] clear that antinepotism and no-spouse rules have a 
disparate impact on women.”  Timothy D. Chandler et al., Spouses Need Not Apply:  The 
Legality of Antinepotism and No-Spouse Rules, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 43, 69 (2002).  
77 Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Love at Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 237, 245 
(2006).  Professor Rabin-Margalioth finds the lack of successful no-spouse claims “sur-
prising” because, “[a]lthough neutral on their face,” no-spouse restrictions “dispropor-
tionately affect the female partner in the relationship, whether upon the mutual 
decision of the couple concerned or the unilateral decision of the employer.”  Id. 
78 See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON 
L. REV. 1, 42 (1995) (“Disparate impact analysis can be used to resolve many of the ac-
commodation problems faced by pregnant women.”); Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment 
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 942-43 (1985) (ad-
vocating for a recognition of pregnancy leave under the disparate impact theory). 
79 See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding a three-day pregnancy leave policy); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 
F.3d 579, 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a disparate impact challenge when a 
pregnant employee was discharged); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 
(11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a disparate impact challenge to an employer’s practice of 
only assigning light duty to officers injured on the job); EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass’n, 
27 F.3d 292, 295-96 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding a leave policy that treated pregnant and 
nonpregnant teachers equally); United States v. Bd. of Educ. of the Consol. High Sch. 
Dist. 230, Palos Hills, Ill., 983 F.2d 790, 797-99 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding the maternal 
leave policy over the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
730 F.2d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding, against a disparate impact claim, Delta’s 
policy of shifting pregnant women to ground duty).  
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never prevail on such claims in the pregnancy context.”80  Yet, one area 
of gender-based disparate impact cases has found success in the courts:  
physical-selection procedure cases.  
III.  A SUBSET OF SUCCESS:  PHYSICAL-SELECTION PROCEDURE CASES 
Discriminatory physical-selection procedure cases under the dis-
parate impact theory serve as an excellent case study of both the poten-
tial and the limitations of the gender-based disparate impact doctrine.  
These cases, which parallel race-based disparate impact cases involving 
written examinations,81 feature female plaintiffs who challenge the use 
of physical-selection procedures, such as weightlifting, push-ups, and 
running, which act as entry barriers to traditionally male-dominated 
jobs.82  Although the Supreme Court recently tackled written examina-
 
80 Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 567, 616 (2010).  In contrast to the limited breadth and depth of positive gender-
based disparate impact case law, feminist advocacy literature encouraging the doc-
trine’s expansion has proliferated.  Professor Michelle Travis, for example, has suggest-
ed using disparate impact theory to increase access to telecommuting.  See Travis, supra 
note 1, at 341-73.  Joan Williams has asserted that advocates seeking to challenge “mas-
culine social norms” in hiring and promoting should consider filing disparate impact 
suits.  JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 104-05 (2000).  Lastly, Lara Gardner has introduced the idea of 
using disparate impact claims to require employers to provide accommodation for 
breastfeeding women.  See Gardner, supra note 1, at 280-81.  
81 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-66 (2009); Guardians Ass’n of 
the N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 83-85, 106 (2d Cir. 
1980); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 509, 513 
(8th Cir. 1977). 
82 In researching this Comment, I have attempted to compile a comprehensive list 
of the physical-selection procedure cases litigated.  Of the cases examined, courts in 
eleven out of nineteen cases have struck down physical-selection procedures for their 
disparate impact on women.  See Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of the Farmingville Fire 
Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 471, 475 (2d Cir. 1999) (invalidating a test that “involved dragging 
a water filled hose—weighing approximately 280 pounds—over a distance of 150 feet”); 
Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 614, 618 (6th Cir. 1980) (invalidating a test that includ-
ed push-ups, sit-ups, and a twenty-five-second obstacle course); Blake v. City of Los An-
geles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1381 n.14, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (invalidating a test that 
involved running a total of fifty yards and scaling a six-foot wall); Easterling v. Connect-
icut, 783 F. Supp. 2d 323, 342-44 (D. Conn. 2011) (invalidating a test that included a 
timed one-and-a-half mile run); United States v. City of Erie, Pa., 411 F. Supp. 2d 524, 
530, 571 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (invalidating a test consisting of an obstacle course, push-ups, 
and sit-ups); Legault v. Russo, 842 F. Supp. 1479, 1482, 1489 (D.N.H. 1994) (invalidat-
ing a ladder-climb, hose-pull, and timed-run test); EEOC v. Simpson Timber Co., No. 
89-1455, 1992 WL 420897, at *3-6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 1992) (invalidating a weight-pull 
test); Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-22 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (invali-
dating a ladder-climb test), rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993); Thomas v. 
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tions in Ricci, it has yet to rule on the validity of physical-selection pro-
cedures.  Lower courts have issued conflicting opinions, both in the 
standards applied83 and in the holdings reached.84  This Part will at-
tempt to explain why some cases succeed while others do not. 
To that end, this Part will identify the various points at which phys-
ical-selection procedure claims tend to break down.  First, the majority 
of cases appear to presume that physical-selection procedures have a 
prima facie disparate impact on women and so proceed directly to an 
analysis of the business necessity defense.85  This approach suggests 
that courts do not view actual disparate impact evidence as an integral 
component of the gender-based disparate impact narrative.  Second, 
some decisions point to the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately prepare for 
exams, an analysis that is inconsistent with the Griggs holding.86  Third, 
the dispositive issue in a majority of cases is the business necessity de-
fense.87  This Part argues that courts have misconstrued the spirit of this 
defense as put forth in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991.  Finally, 
litigants struggle against claims that “strength is everything” and that 
 
City of Evanston, 610 F. Supp. 422, 425, 432 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (invalidating a stair-climb, 
timed-run, and obstacle-course test); Burney v. City of Pawtucket, 559 F. Supp. 1089, 
1099 & n.15, 1103 (D.R.I. 1983) (invalidating a test that included a body-fat measure-
ment and a long jump); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 481 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 
(E.D. Wis. 1979) (invalidating a requirement that paramedics pass a twelve-week fire-
fighter training course).   
Eight out of nineteen cases have upheld physical-selection procedures as valid un-
der Title VII.  See Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning II), 308 F.3d 286, 288  (3d 
Cir. 2002) (validating a test that required applicants to run one-and-a-half miles in 
twelve minutes); Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 213, 217-220 (6th Cir. 
1990) (validating a test involving an overhead lift); Cleghorn v. Herrington, 813 F.2d 
992, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (validating a physical-fitness test for security personnel in a 
nuclear facility); Berkman II, 705 F.2d 584, 587, 590 n.5 (2d Cir. 1983) (validating a test 
that included ladder raising and hose drags); Evans v. City of Evanston, 695 F. Supp. 
922, 924, 928 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (validating a ladder-climb, hose-connect, and agility-
course test), vacated, 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. City of Wichita Falls, 
704 F. Supp. 709, 711, 715 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (validating an obstacle-course and dummy-
drag test); Eison v. City of Knoxville, 570 F. Supp. 11, 12-13 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (validat-
ing a test consisting of sit-ups, push-ups, squats, and a two-mile run); Hardy v. Stumpf, 
576 P.2d 1342, 1343-44 (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (validating a wall-scaling test). 
83 For analysis of the various courts’ differing standards, see David E. Hollar, Physi-
cal Ability Tests and Title VII, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 785-93 (2000). 
84 See supra note 82. 
85 See infra Section III.A. 
86 See infra Section III.B. 
87 See infra Section III.C. 
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“more is better,” stereotypical and anachronistic assumptions regard-
ing the traits needed to perform traditionally male occupations.88    
This Part suggests that the courts’ proclivities can largely be ex-
plained by their tendency to bypass the formal doctrine and instead 
heed their own traditional assumptions about gender.  Courts place 
undue emphasis on arguments that should not be part of the disparate 
impact discourse.  Courts also rely on presumptions about an employ-
er’s needs without critically analyzing the validity of these presump-
tions and the context in which they have developed.  While it is likely 
that some of these issues are not unique to gender-based disparate im-
pact claims, it is not my intention to compare these physical-selection 
cases to written-examination cases where race is at issue.  It suffices to 
say that it is helpful for all physical-selection procedure plaintiffs to 
consider and be aware of the following common obstacles. 
A.  Absence of Disparate Impact Statistics 
Under the traditional disparate impact analysis, the first issue typi-
cally addressed is the presence or absence of a statistically adverse im-
pact on a protected class.  The minimum threshold needed to establish 
a disparate impact has been hotly contested, with plaintiffs and defend-
ants clashing over the “four-fifths rule,”89 the minimum sample size,90 
and the relevant labor market.91  Yet practically all of the physical-
selection procedure cases in the gender context have completely by-
passed the issue of adverse impact.  For example, in seven of the eight 
 
88 See infra Section III.D. 
89 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2011) (stating that a selection rate “for any race, sex, 
or ethnic group” that is less than eighty percent “of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evi-
dence of adverse impact”); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 
995 n.3 (1988) (describing the EEOC’s eighty-percent standard as having been “criti-
cized on technical grounds” and characterizing it as no “more than a rule of thumb for 
the courts”).  
90 See, e.g., Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650, 657, 658 n.10 (1st 
Cir. 1985) (concluding that “[w]here the size of the sample is small . . . the ‘four-fifths 
rule’ is not an accurate test of discriminatory impact”).  
91 See, e.g., EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 299-303 (7th Cir. 
1991) (finding the use of Chicago as the “relevant labor market” inappropriate because 
the varying levels of interest for the jobs at issue, based on commuting time and lan-
guage preference, could not adequately be taken into account); Pina v. City of E. Prov-
idence, 492 F. Supp. 1240, 1246 (D.R.I. 1980) (determining that the use of the “general 
population” as the relevant labor market was “proper” because firefighting is a skill that 
“the general population may possess”).  
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cases in which physical-selection procedures were validated, courts first 
determined that a disparate impact existed but then found an appro-
priate business necessity.92  Indeed, most of the courts found the exist-
ence of a disparate impact as a matter of course and paid only scant 
attention to the statistical support advanced by the plaintiffs.93  As 
such, “disparate impact” as a statistical inquiry has been noticeably 
absent from physical-selection procedure cases.   
Plaintiffs’ attempts to introduce the stark discrepancies in hiring 
rates often fail to persuade.  In Berkman v. City of New York (Berkman IV ), 
for example, a total of seven women placed in the top 15,316 applicants 
on a physical-abilities test.94  Most courts disclose the statistics in their 
opinions but nevertheless find that business necessity justifies the em-
ployer’s discriminatory practices.  These courts quickly shuttle through 
the statistical analyses, so painstakingly put together by previous courts,95 
en route to more “meaningful” analyses.  It seems that courts are more 
interested in analyzing the qualities of the job in question than the sta-
tistics that substantiated the adverse impact claim in the first place.96   
 
92 See supra note 82 for a list and description of these cases.  The only exception to 
this pattern is Eison v. City of Knoxville in which the plaintiff claimed that a physical-
qualification test had a disparate impact on female applicants to the police force.  570 
F. Supp. 11, 12 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).  If the plaintiff’s specific test class from 1982 had 
been analyzed separately, it would have fallen below the “four-fifths rule.”  Id. at 13.  
However, the court found that a proper analysis should include all applicants who took 
the same test throughout the years of its administration; thus, the court found “no ad-
verse impact on women.”  Id. 
93 In the Lanning I litigation, for example, the district court devoted only five “find-
ings of law” in determining that a prima facie case of disparate impact existed.  Lan-
ning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., Nos. 97-0593, 97-1161, 1998 WL 341605, at *55 (E.D. Pa. 
June 25, 1998), vacated, 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).  However, it devoted sixty-five 
“findings of law” to the question of whether defendants had a proper business necessity 
defense.  Id. at *55-70.  Likewise, in United States v. City of Wichita Falls, the court devoted 
only several sentences to the analysis of statistical adverse impact.  704 F. Supp. 709, 712 
(N.D. Tex. 1988).  As it hastily continued, “However, simply because a test has an adverse 
impact under the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on a minority group does not mean that 
the test necessarily is discriminatory.”  Id. 
94 812 F.2d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1987). 
95 See supra Part I.  
96 In fact, in light of the Court’s decision in Ricci, there may be even more at stake 
in achieving a comprehensive doctrinal framework for the statistical analyses surround-
ing disparate impact.  The Ricci Court held that an employer is liable for overturning 
test results unless it can demonstrate that it had a strong evidentiary basis that certifying 
such results would result in its losing a disparate impact action.  129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676-
77 (2009).  While the implications of this holding remain debated, Joseph Seiner and 
Benjamin Gutman have argued that Ricci creates an affirmative defense if the defend-
ants can prove they did not know the practice would have an unlawful disparate impact.  
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B.  Failure to Train 
One common pitfall encountered in physical-selection procedure 
cases is the sufficiency of the claimants’ training and preparation.  A 
number of physical-selection procedure cases, including the Third 
Circuit’s Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
decisions (Lanning I and II),97 added a new component to the dispar-
ate impact narrative:  an adequate preparation requirement.  In Lan-
ning I and II, female plaintiffs challenged the use of a physical-fitness-
screening test that required applicants to run one-and-a-half miles with-
in twelve minutes.98  The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Au-
thority (SEPTA) conceded that the test produced a disparate impact on 
women as 55.6% of male applicants passed the test, compared to 6.7% 
of female applicants.99  Finding that SEPTA had not shown that its fit-
ness-test cutoff score measured “the minimum qualifications necessary 
for successful performance of the job in question,” the Third Circuit in 
Lanning I reversed the district court’s ruling for the defendants.100 
However, Judge Weis’s dissent developed an interesting argument:  
he pointed out that “nearly all women who trained for [the running 
test] were able to pass.”101  Videotapes revealed that plaintiff Cathy 
Lanning had walked for a portion of the test, demonstrating what 
Judge Weis deemed a “‘cavalier’ attitude towards the running test.”102  
The lack of training proved crucial to Judge Weis’s analysis of the case:   
Here, where applicants have it within their power to prepare for the run-
ning test, they may properly be expected to do so.  In view of the im-
portant public safety concerns at issue, it is not unreasonable to expect 
 
Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2204.  Thus, under this framework, the statistical 
analysis of whether a disparate impact exists would be relevant not only for a plaintiff’s 
prima facie case but also for a defendant’s affirmative defense.  It may be even more 
important for potential litigators and defendants to understand what exactly a “dispar-
ate impact” looks like in the first instance. 
97 See Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning II), 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning I), 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999). 
98 Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 288; Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 481-83. 
99 Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 483. 
100 Id. at 494.  The Third Circuit remanded the case and instructed the district 
court to reassess SEPTA’s business necessity defense under this “minimum qualifica-
tions” standard.  Id. 
101 Id. at 495 (Weis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
102 Id. 
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all applicants—female or male—to take the necessary steps in order to 
qualify for the positions.103 
Despite Ms. Lanning’s affidavit describing her diligent preparation 
for the test,104 and despite her subsequent successful career with the 
University of Pennsylvania Police Department’s tactical bicycle unit,105 
Judge Weis was not convinced.    
When the case reached the court of appeals for the second time, 
the majority incorporated portions of Judge Weis’s Lanning I dissent 
into its decision.  In “one final note,” the court stated the following: 
While it is undisputed that SEPTA’s 1.5 mile run test has a disparate im-
pact on women, it is also undisputed that, in addition to those women who 
could pass the test without training, nearly all the women who trained 
were able to pass after only a moderate amount of training. It is not, we 
think, unreasonable to expect that women—and men—who wish to be-
come SEPTA transit officers, and are committed to dealing with issues of 
public safety on a day-to-day basis, would take this necessary step.106 
Given this language, it is unclear whether the court intended to 
make training part of the prima facie analysis—a possible limitation on 
the use of actual statistics to prove a prima facie adverse impact—or 
some sort of affirmative defense against “cavalier” plaintiffs, or a mere 
chastisement, in dicta, of the plaintiffs’ lack of effort.  
Lanning II is not the only case that has made reference to a plain-
tiff’s failure to train.  Another gender-based disparate impact case, 
Berkman v. City of New York (Berkman IV ), has also alluded to the train-
ing aspect.  In that case, plaintiffs were given the opportunity to partic-
ipate in a special training program for women in preparation for a 
physical-abilities test.107  In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the test 
had a disparate impact, the court noted in passing that many of the 
female applicants had refused this training, and that the training had 
proven effective for those female applicants who did participate in the 
 
103 Id. at 501.  In fact, SEPTA’s brief described how Ms. Lanning “ran a portion of 
the course with her hands in her pockets.”  Brief for Appellee Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority at 9, Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478 (Nos. 98-1644, 98-1755), 1999 
WL 33617177. 
104 See Brief for Appellants Lanning et al. at 58, Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478 (Nos. 98-
1644, 98-1755), 1998 WL 34085350 (“Officer Lanning paid to attend a police academy.  
When she trained to pass the SEPTA run, she developed a 1.5 mile course, practiced 
running it on a routine basis, and timed herself as she ran.”). 
105 Id. at 31. 
106 Lanning II, 308 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2002). 
107 Berkman IV, 812 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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program.108  Failure-to-train language has also made its way into race-
based disparate impact decisions.  In its Ricci decision, for example, 
the Supreme Court mentioned in dicta that a possible argument in 
favor of certifying the New Haven test results might stem from the fact 
that the test was easy to pass if the candidate had studied.109  As one 
firefighter candidate explained, “[e]very one” of the questions on the 
written examination “came from the [study] material. . . . [I]f you read 
the materials and you studied the material, you would have done well 
on the test.”110  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that access to 
such study materials “fell at least in part along racial lines.”111  Other 
lower court decisions addressing the validity of written examinations 
have also discussed the potential impact of failure to study.112     
This failure-to-train branch of thought has been coined “contribu-
tory” disparate impact theory by some scholars.113  Professor Peter 
Siegelman, for example, has advocated for a new affirmative defense 
that would exculpate defendants “if they can show that plaintiffs seeking 
to establish disparate impact liability failed to make reasonable efforts to 
meet the job requirement being challenged.”114  While contributory dis-
 
108 Id. at 55, 62.  The court, however, did not ultimately rely on this rationale.  In-
stead, it focused on the business necessity affirmative defense.  Id. at 59-60. 
109 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 2693 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
112 See, e.g., Perry v. Orange Cnty., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2004) 
(arguing that one of the plaintiffs “should have been excluded from the disparate im-
pact analysis” because, among other things, she did not purchase the test preparation 
materials for the fire department promotion exam); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 544 
F. Supp. 1231, 1253 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (“[T]he [written] test does not improperly impact 
upon blacks, but instead the low test score resulted from lack of study.”), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, No. 77-
1706, 1977 WL 15509, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1977) (holding that because the plain-
tiffs “did not attempt to seriously perform well” on their accounting exams there was 
not an “adverse effect on Spanish surnamed persons”), aff’d, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 
1981).  Contreras, at least, can be distinguished from Ricci because it involved an unusu-
ally small sample size and a group of professional accountants.  See 1977 WL 15509, at *5 
(“The Senior Accountant plaintiffs are trained specialists in the accounting profession 
who have pursued their chosen work for a substantial length of time. . . . Their qualifica-
tions to pass a multiple choice test should be substantially greater than minority appli-
cants seeking to be firemen.”).   
113 See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Contributory Disparate Impacts in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515, 515 (2007). 
114 Id. at 520; see also Laya Sleiman, Note, A Duty To Make Reasonable Efforts and a De-
fense of the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2677, 2682 (2004) (“The theory of disparate impact can thus be strengthened and 
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parate impact theory is “far from well-established,” Professor Charles 
Sullivan has predicted that “the extension of the theory to all races and 
both genders may lead more courts to explore this approach.”115 
The problem with Lanning II, and especially a contributory negli-
gence disparate impact theory, is that it is simply unsupported by the 
disparate impact paradigm.  The current framework of disparate impact 
centers on three specific questions.  First, is there an adverse impact on 
a protected class?  Second, is there a business necessity for this adverse 
impact?  Third, is there an alternative procedure that will satisfy the em-
ployer’s needs without having an adverse impact on these individuals?  
It is far from clear which of these questions would be answered by a 
plaintiff’s failure to train.  It certainly is not relevant to the prima facie 
case, as the Court has already held that disparate impact can be demon-
strated without actual applicant pool statistics,116 and thus a focus on 
actual plaintiffs is unwarranted.  And it seems even less relevant to a 
question of business necessity or alternative methods. 
More broadly, failure-to-train theories attempt to bring to light the 
fact that applicant preparation, and not the test itself, was the “actual” 
cause of the disparate impact.  Yet it has been made abundantly clear 
that disparate impact discrimination focuses on the consequences of em-
ployment practices, and the presence of an alternative predicating fac-
tor cannot excuse a discriminatory test.117  It does not matter whether 
the disparate impact was caused by the bad faith of employers, lack of 
applicant preparation, or a poorly designed entrance examination; 
what is critical in the prima facie case is the impact itself.118  As the 
Ninth Circuit explained in Bouman v. Block, 
 
made more defensible if it is improved to allow for recovery only when plaintiffs have 
put forth reasonable efforts . . . to comply with an employer’s hiring criteria.”).   
115 Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?:  Disparate Impact Claims by 
White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1563 (2004).  
116 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (“There is no require-
ment . . . that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must always be based on 
analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants.”). 
117 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“Congress directed 
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion.”); EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(“Discrimination may . . . result from otherwise neutral policies and practices that, when 
actuated in real-life settings, operate to the distinct disadvantage of certain classes of 
individuals.”). 
118 As discussed earlier, courts do not spend much time discussing the actual prima 
facie case in physical-selection procedure cases.  See supra Section III.A.  In light of these 
tendencies, it is important for plaintiffs to contextualize their arguments, urging con-
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After all, the whole point of a disparate impact challenge is that a facially 
non-discriminatory employment or promotion device—in this case an 
examination—has a discriminatory effect.  It would be odd indeed if a de-
fendant whose facially non-discriminatory examination which has a dis-
parate impact could escape the obligation to validate the examination 
merely by pointing to some other facially non-discriminatory factor that 
correlates with the disparate impact.119 
Consider the impact of a failure-to-train analysis on the landmark 
Griggs case—should those plaintiffs have been condemned for not study-
ing hard enough?  Would the plaintiffs who had not adequately pre-
pared for the GED exam be excluded from statistics establishing a 
disparate impact?  In Griggs, the Supreme Court noted that the African 
American plaintiffs were more likely to fail aptitude tests because, as 
compared to whites, they had received “inferior education in segregated 
schools.”120  Plaintiffs’ lack of education was an alternative predicating 
factor to their low passage rate on the test in question, but that fact did 
not preclude the Court from finding a disparate impact.121  If an alterna-
tive predicating factor could undermine a prima facie case, then even 
the landmark Griggs case might have been decided differently.122 
Introduction of preparation and training evidence should not be 
taken lightly; it is highly prejudicial and panders to the stereotype that 
women are weak, both in body and in will, and the perception that 
hard-working men lose their jobs due to the “preferential treatment”123 
of women who fail to meet the bare minimum of expectations.  In fact, 
 
sideration of historical deprivation as well as actual doctrinal application.  See infra Sec-
tions IV.A and IV.D. 
119 940 F.2d 1211, 1228 (9th Cir. 1991). 
120 401 U.S. at 430. 
121 See id. at 436 (“What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must meas-
ure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”); see also Stagi v. Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 671, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“[T]he existence of some 
ultimate cause for which the employer is not legally responsible cannot defeat a plaintiff’s 
prima facie case.”); Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 937 F. Supp. 1397, 1410 
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that “[d]efendants cannot escape liability by showing that the 
disparate impact is attributable to particular background factors” such as lack of English 
language skills and lack of education), aff’d, 183 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). 
122 Interestingly, the only Supreme Court decision on gender-based disparate im-
pact, Dothard v. Rawlinson, would not have been changed by performing a failure-to-
train analysis, because Dothard held that certain statutory height and weight require-
ments—that is, traits that are indisputably beyond a person’s control—violated Title 
VII.  433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).  As discussed earlier, Dothard did not extend its reason-
ing to strength requirements, perhaps further underscoring the weak posture of the 
Dothard decision.  See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.   
123 Grossman, supra note 80, at 617. 
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there may be an evidentiary basis upon which to exclude such argu-
ments as irrelevant to the disparate impact framework,124  as they have 
no place in current prima facie analysis and are even less appropriate 
in discussing job relatedness and alternative methods.125  The courts’ 
consideration of such evidence is another obstacle faced by gender-
based disparate impact litigants. 
C.  The Catchall Business Necessity Defense 
The business necessity affirmative defense is the doctrinal grave-
yard for gender-based disparate impact claims.126  Due to the lack of 
clarity in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,127 the silence of the Supreme 
Court, and the consequent inconsistency of appellate court stand-
ards,128 judges have exercised considerable discretion in deciding how 
 
124 The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude all evidence that is not relevant.  FED. R. 
EVID. 402; see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining “relevant evidence” as “having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”).  
Additionally, Rule 403 excludes even relevant evidence if “its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
presentation of cumulative evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
125 Professor Siegelman has argued that courts should create a new affirmative de-
fense for defendants who can prove that plaintiffs failed to train for their test.  See supra 
notes 113-14 and accompanying text.  While that is certainly possible, none of the deci-
sions discussed above has established this affirmative defense in so many words and thus 
it remains a tentative recommendation at best.  However, establishing a failure-to-train 
defense is overly complicated and unnecessary.  First, most plaintiffs already have a 
non–litigation-related incentive for training:  passing the test.  Second, while it is rela-
tively easy to train for a timed run, other physical-selection procedure tests require 
more strenuous preparation.  See, e.g., Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 
1220 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (describing a test that involved a five-story ladder climb), rev’d 
on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993).  Mandating that applicants train adequately 
for these tests (or, alternatively, allowing defendants to escape liability by proving that 
applicants did not train) extends an advantage to those with the resources to do so. 
126 Indeed, the eight cases studied in this Comment that resulted in selection-
procedure validation all found a legitimate business necessity in their particular set of 
facts.  See supra note 82. 
127 See Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 
45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1993) (“[T]he Act is so ambiguous, and leaves so many 
major questions unanswered, that it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty 
what its impact will be other than to delay and complicate litigation for the foreseeable 
future.”). 
128 See Hollar, supra note 83, at 785 (“Because the Supreme Court precedent is so 
confusing and the terms ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ are seemingly redundant, 
lower courts have struggled to articulate a rule for analyzing physical test cases.”).  Hol-
lar summarizes four major standards that have emerged for evaluating physical-abilities 
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to administer this defense.129  For advocates hoping to expand the 
gender-based disparate impact doctrine, this discretion has proven to 
be more of a curse than a blessing.  Indeed, the business necessity doc-
trine has become a sort of catchall that legitimizes the court’s intuitive 
reluctance to invalidate discriminatory selection procedures.   
Doctrinally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the business ne-
cessity defense, allowing employers to escape Title VII liability if they 
can prove “that the challenged practice is job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity.”130  Thus, the affirma-
tive defense analysis essentially focuses on two different, but related, 
questions.  First, the defendant must establish sufficient job validity:  is 
the skill being tested actually necessary for satisfactory job perfor-
mance?131  Second, the defendant must prove sufficient content validi-
ty:  is the test in place actually related to this skill?132   
Consider again the height and weight requirements at issue in   
Dothard.  The Dothard Court rejected the requirements because the 
defendants had failed to produce evidence “correlating the height and 
weight requirements with the requisite amount of strength thought 
essential to good job performance.”133  That is, the Court found that 
this particular test (the height and weight requirement) was not sub-
stantially reflective of the skill needed (strength).  Thus, the employer’s 
test in Dothard failed due to its lack of content validity.  The defendant 
also bore the burden of proving that strength was a business necessity 
for the job in question—that is, its job validity.  Strength is not per se 
important to every occupation, but Dothard failed to clarify this point. 
 
tests under Title VII:  (1) the manifest-relationship test; (2) the public-safety doctrine; 
(3) the close-approximation-to-job-tasks approach; and (4) the minimum-qualifications 
requirement.  Id. at 785-93.   
129 Notably, even the least deferential standards have resulted in sustaining business 
necessity defenses.  See, e.g., Lanning II, 308 F.3d 286, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying 
the minimum-qualifications test).  And even the most lenient standards have resulted 
in the rejection of the defense.  See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 616 n.6 (6th Cir. 
1980) (employing the manifest-relationship test). 
130 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
131 See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Graffam v. Scott Paper 
Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Me. 1994) (requiring an inquiry into “whether the job 
criteria arise out of a manifest business need”). 
132 See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (“What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and 
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of 
job performance.”); Graffam, 870 F. Supp. at 400 (requiring an inquiry into “whether 
there is a correlation between the criteria used and successful job performance”). 
133 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). 
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Most courts have adopted a single standard to deal with both con-
tent validity and job validity.134  The consequence of this approach is 
that the question of job analysis is at best conflated with that of con-
tent analysis and at worst completely overlooked.  In Hardy v. Stumpf, 
for example, the California Supreme Court examined the validity of a 
physical-performance test for Oakland’s police force that required an 
applicant to scale a six-foot wall.135  In finding that the test was justified 
by business necessity, the court pointed to the fact that the test re-
quired applicants to perform a necessary job skill.136  As the court 
quipped, “Surely, it is difficult to imagine a more accurate way of test-
ing ability to scale a six-foot wall than to scale one.”137 
Likewise, in Evans v. City of Evanston, the plaintiff challenged a pre-
training physical-screening test for becoming a firefighter that re-
quired applicants to climb an aerial ladder, drag hoses, and walk 
through ten tires while carrying a tarp, all within a fixed time period.138  
The defendant’s test creators consulted at least two “experts in fire-
fighting” to ensure the screening test simulated on-the-job tasks.139  
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the test “was con-
structed without an effort to quantify the physiological requirements 
of the job of [a] firefighter.”140  The court reasoned: 
Under [the plaintiff’s] theory, one might say of the typist that he or she 
needs hand and finger speed, and coordination, eye control and the ca-
pacity for sustained concentration; and the best way to test these is to 
measure the physiological requirements of each of these elements in typ-
ing and then apply appropriate tests for each.  All this rather than ask the 
candidate to sit and type.141 
Despite a male passage rate of over ninety percent and a female 
passage rate of less than sixteen percent, the court—citing the similarity 
 
134 Hollar, supra note 83, at 794.  
135 576 P.2d 1342, 1343-44 (Cal. 1978) (en banc).  The wall-scaling test was specifically 
devised because, by law, Oakland fences could be no more than six feet.  Id. at 1345. 
136 See id. (“The record clearly establishes a reasonable relationship between the phys-
ical performance test—particularly the six-foot wall climb—and job performance.”). 
137 Id. at 1347. 
138 695 F. Supp. 922, 923-24 (N.D. Ill. 1988), vacated, 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989).  
The City of Evanston set its cut-off time for passing the test at one standard deviation 
above the mean, which typically allowed about eighty-four percent of the applicant 
pool to pass.  Id. at 929.  The district court ultimately held that the time limitation was 
unreasonable.  Id.   
139 Id. at 924. 
140 Id. at 927-28. 
141 Id. at 927. 
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between the components of the test and the requirements of the job—
validated the test.142 
The Evans and Hardy courts seemed to find it intuitive that a test 
replicating a job-related skill should be validated, and they conse-
quently dismissed alternative tests for falling short of the ideal.143  Had 
these courts performed a two-step analysis, however, they might have 
understood the problem:  the accuracy of the test is dependent on 
what it is trying to measure.144  If the point of the test is to establish the 
applicant’s ability to perform one specific task (in Hardy, the appli-
cant’s ability to scale a wall), then the test is certainly a valid indicator 
of that particular skill.  However, the defendant would then need to 
prove that the wall-scaling skill is substantially related to the job at 
hand.145  For example, the defendant might be required to introduce 
evidence of the number of times wall-scaling is actually performed by 
the average police officer. 
Alternatively, if the point of the test is to determine the applicant’s 
general physical fitness, rather than the applicant’s wall-climbing ability, 
then the job-relatedness issue would be easily established.  After all, 
some level of physical fitness is without question an important aspect 
of a police officer’s job.146  However, the defendant would still need to 
prove that the examination was an appropriate test for measuring phys-
ical fitness.  In this alternative, the fact that the test is closely related to 
an actual job responsibility is confounding and likely irrelevant.147  To 
continue with the analogy used in Evans, rejecting a test that asked a 
 
142 Id. at 925, 928. 
143 Id. at 925; Hardy v. Stumpf, 576 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Cal. 1978). 
144 The EEOC has established three types of validity:  criterion, content, and con-
struct.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (2011).  All three types relate to this general point.  
For definitions of these validities, see supra note 53.   
145 The standard necessary to determine a substantial relationship between the skill 
and the job will vary by jurisdiction.  See supra note 128.  In Harless v. Duck, for instance, 
the Sixth Circuit found under the lenient “manifest relationship” standard that a test 
must present concrete evidence of the “amount” of the certain skill needed.  619 F.2d 
611, 616 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1980).  Applying this rationale in Hardy, a defendant would 
need to demonstrate an appropriate “amount” of wall-scaling to justify that component 
of the job-application test. 
146 See Harless, 619 F.2d at 616 (“Undoubtedly, police officers must meet certain 
physical standards to be capable of performing their jobs safely and effectively.”). 
147 See, e.g., Easterling v. Connecticut, 783 F. Supp. 2d 323, 340-41 (D. Conn. 2011) 
(explaining that the mile-and-a-half run required for becoming a corrections officer 
(CO) “was only meant to measure aerobic capacity” and that while “[a]erobic capacity 
is a prerequisite to a number of activities a CO might have to perform . . . [r]unning 
itself [was] not a close approximation to the typical duties of a CO”). 
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typist to type may not seem as absurd if the overall skill being tested 
were the ability to manage an office.   
Moreover, both Evans and Hardy merely required the test as a pre-
screening device prior to entering a training academy.148  In other 
words, following this selection procedure, applicants were sent to a 
training academy to ensure that they learned the required skills.  The 
relevant analogy is thus not a typist being tested on her ability to type, 
but rather a typist being denied entrance into a training school because 
of her inability, at that precise moment, to type fast enough.  In fact, 
the EEOC regulations specifically instruct employers to “avoid making 
employment decisions on the basis of measures of knowledges, skills, 
or abilities which are normally learned in a brief orientation period, 
and which have an adverse impact.”149 
It may be that, even under this doctrinal analysis, defendants will 
ultimately demonstrate that tests that accurately assess job-related re-
sponsibilities also sufficiently reflect a skill that is necessary for job per-
formance.  Using this two-step process, however, will help displace some 
of the adjudicator’s tendencies to appeal to her own intuitions of how 
things ought to be.150  It will force the defendant to provide more than 
just simple assertions of gut feelings or repetitions of the status quo.  
Most importantly, it will reorient the conversation to focus on the 
Griggs disparate impact doctrine. 
 
148 In fact, studies have shown that “[w]omen benefit greatly from training because 
most tests have a significant skill component which can readily be taught.”  Ruth 
Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection Devices for Traditionally Male Occupations as 
Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 803 (1986).  In Berk-
man v. City of New York (Berkman I), one of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses testified that 
for selection procedures, “what must be identified are not those who are strongest or 
fastest but, instead, those who, with the benefit of training in pacing . . . can perform 
the punishing tasks of firefighting as they are actually required to be performed.”  536 
F. Supp. 177, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).  These witnesses also testified that “firefighting takes 
its toll, not as a result of failures of maximum strength or speed, even at critical mo-
ments, but rather through the physical demands extending over long periods of time 
which necessitate paced performance at less-than-maximum levels.”  Id. 
149 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(F).   
150 At least one court has written approvingly of the two-step inquiry, though the 
court itself did not follow this approach.  See Easterling, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (“A se-
cond viable interpretation of the foregoing precedent is that determining whether a 
hiring practice is ‘job related and consistent with business necessity’ is a two-step in-
quiry.” (emphasis added)). 
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D.  “Strength Is Not Always Everything,” and 
“More Is Not Always Better” 
Plaintiffs in physical-selection procedure cases struggle against at 
least two other stereotypical assumptions regarding female applicants 
that undermine the Supreme Court case law as put forth in Griggs and 
its progeny.  First, plaintiffs must combat the assumption that occupa-
tions requiring physical exertion, such as firefighting and policing, must 
necessarily involve only such traditional physical traits as speed, size, and 
strength.151  This “strength is everything” assumption has been repeat-
edly questioned by historical anecdotes and personal testimony.152  
Some male SEPTA officers interviewed in the process of the Lanning I 
and II litigation, for example, stated that it was their experience that 
when arresting male perpetrators, sometimes a female officer could de-
escalate the situation better than a male officer could.153  Indeed, the 
defendants were unable to produce any evidence at trial suggesting 
that they had ever taken disciplinary action against an officer because 
she could not perform the physical aspects of her job.154 
Similarly, courts often make the assumption that in terms of physi-
cal skill, “more is better.”  Under this theory, physical-abilities tests 
should be scored on a rank-order basis rather than simply pass or 
fail.155  In 1979, Brenda Berkman challenged the New York City Fire 
Department’s rank-order entrance examination for its adverse impact 
 
151 Colker, supra note 148, at 776-79. 
152 See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1379 n.7 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“Shorter officers may have certain advantages in observing field situations (e.g., the abil-
ity to look under objects, the ability to squeeze through narrow passageways) that taller 
officers lack.”); David Holmstrom, Women Officers Arrest the Gender Gap, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Jan. 12, 2000, at 11, 14 (asserting that women may improve police forces due 
to their ability to resolve neighborhood and family disputes as well as other problems). 
153 E-mail from Lisa Rau, Att’y of Record for Lanning I & II to author (Oct. 12, 
2011, 11:37 AM) (on file with author).  It should be noted, however, that this was not a 
position advanced by Rau or any other counsel for the Lanning I and II plaintiffs.  Ra-
ther, this belief “was what was reported by experienced male transit police offic-
ers.  The Lanning Plaintiffs did not assert that they would be better than their male 
police officer counterparts but simply that they should be not be discriminated against 
in hiring when they were fully qualified to do the job.”  Id. 
154 Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1999).  According to the plaintiff’s brief on 
appeal, the defendants were unable to demonstrate in the court below that any officer 
provided inadequate backup assistance due to an inability to run a mile and a half in 
twelve minutes.  Brief for Appellants Lanning et al., supra note 104, at 2.  SEPTA dis-
continued the use of the contested running test in the fall of 2009.  Telephone Inter-
view with David Scott, Deputy Chief, SEPTA Transit Police Dep’t (Nov. 23, 2011).   
155 See, e.g., Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 493-94 nn. 22-23. 
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on female applicants.156  Initially, the Department did not attempt to 
perform any content or job validity.  Instead, it justified the rank-order 
with the “obvious” conclusion “that every increment in the abilities 
tested for in its physical exam necessarily represents a better perfor-
mance as a firefighter.”157  The district court rejected this argument 
and noted that “rank-ordering should be used only if it can be shown 
that a higher score . . . is likely to result in better job performance.”158  
Here, the physical tasks measured by the entrance exam were not rep-
resentative of actual tasks performed by firefighters because they re-
quired candidates to perform the tasks anaerobically, while firefighters 
in the field use both anaerobic and aerobic skills simultaneously.159  
The Second Circuit nevertheless validated the test.160  Basing its con-
clusion partially on “self-evident” intuitions, the Second Circuit found 
that “the Fire Department is entitled to select those who are endowed 
with the physical abilities to act effectively in the first moments of arri-
val at a fire scene, where immediate speed and strength literally con-
cern matters of life and death.”161   
The two stereotypes apparent in Berkman and Lanning reflect a 
“nested doll” problem:  unfounded assumptions are nested within 
each other, and a victory that peels away one assumption (that “more 
is better”) reveals yet another assumption (that applicants who are 
naturally “endowed” aerobically will be more effective “in the first 
 
156 Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. 177, 179, 204-05 (E.D.N.Y 1982).  Prior to applying to 
become a firefighter, Brenda Berkman—a marathon runner—trained diligently for the 
physical-performance examination by doing things like chopping wood and “carry[ing] 
[her] husband up and down the stairs of [their] apartment building.”  Brenda Berk-
man, Remarks at The American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law 
Event:  “Taking the Heat:  Gender Discrimination in Firefighting” (Oct. 21, 2008), in 
Taking the Heat, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 713, 720 (2009).  At the time 
Berkman applied, “The New York City Fire Department had more than 11,000 firefight-
ers . . . [and] not one was a female.”  Richard Ugelow, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. 
Of Law, Remarks at The American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law 
Event:  “Taking the Heat:  Gender Discrimination in Firefighting” (Oct. 21, 2008), in 
Taking the Heat, supra, at 717. 
157 Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. at 211.  
158 Id. at 210 (alteration in original) (quoting Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. Police 
Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 100 (2d Cir. 1980)).  The Second Circuit 
in Guardians held that “it is reasonable to insist that the test measure important aspects 
of the job.”  630 F.2d at 99. 
159 Susan T. Epstein, Women in the Firehouse:  The Second Circuit Upholds a Gender-
Biased Firefighters’ Examination, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 511, 523 (1988). 
160 Berkman IV, 812 F.2d 52, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1987). 
161 Id. at 59.  Rank-order tests have also been held valid in Cleveland.  See Zamlen v. 
City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 220 (6th Cir. 1990).   
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moments of arrival at the scene of a fire”162).  In order to transcend 
these stereotypes, then, advocates must confront each assumption 
head on.  For example, in challenging the “more is better” assump-
tion, Professor Ruth Colker has asserted that the job analysis under-
taken to substantiate rank-order tests often does not include women.163  
As she argues, “In order to assess whether a test is valid on a rank-
order basis it is crucial to include women in the job analysis.  To date 
[1986], no job analysis has included female participants.”164  Advocates 
must demonstrate that by relying on these analyses, courts base a busi-
ness necessity defense on a set of data—here the job analysis—that is 
itself a product of stereotypes.  Relying on this type of analysis defeats 
the very purpose of disparate impact theory. 
IV.  BEST PRACTICES FOR GENDER-BASED  
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES 
Because roughly half the physical-selection procedure cases studied 
in this Comment have resulted in the judicial validation of the test in 
question,165 the sample lends itself to a comparison between the cases 
that have invalidated tests and those that have not.  I have identified 
four best practices that have proven beneficial in the physical-selection 
procedure realm and that may also be applicable to gender-based dis-
parate impact cases in general. 
First, an advocate should contextualize the problem at hand.  Since 
a vast majority of physical-selection procedure plaintiffs seek positions 
in traditionally male occupations, contextualizing the industry as such 
will give the factfinder a narrative in which to frame the litigation.  Se-
cond, an advocate should appeal to the factfinder’s capacity to dismiss 
unfounded stereotypes.  This can be achieved by calling as witnesses 
female applicants who failed the test in question but ultimately proved 
to be skilled and successful in their jobs.  Third, an advocate should 
 
162 Berkman IV, 812 F.2d at 59. 
163 Colker, supra note 148, at 798; see also Easterling v. Connecticut, 783 F. Supp. 2d 
323, 328 (D. Conn. 2011) (“The plaintiff has presented expert testimony that 
the . . . percentile rankings used by the [Department of Corrections] were based on 
measurements from a sample of women who possessed a higher level of fitness than the 
overall female population.”); Brief for Appellants Lanning et al., supra note 104, at 48 
(arguing that because SEPTA’s simulation included only five percent of women, this 
fact “increases the necessary scrutiny” given to the test and the design procedure). 
164 Colker, supra note 148, at 798.  
165 See supra note 82. 
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address valid concerns by providing concrete examples of effective 
alternative-selection procedures from other municipalities.  Presenting 
such reasonable alternatives can help the factfinder overcome public 
safety concerns.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an advocate 
should consistently refer back to the purpose and intent of the disparate 
impact cause of action, emphasizing its stated neutrality and its conse-
quent potential for social change. 
A.  Contextualize the Test and the Industry 
To understand the discourse surrounding physical-selection pro-
cedures, it is informative to review the tradition of exclusion faced by 
women seeking to enter the law enforcement and firefighting profes-
sions.  In many major cities, women were not permitted to apply for cer-
tain positions within police forces or firefighting squads until the 
1970s.166  Indeed, the City of New York did not open its firefighter appli-
cant exam to women until 1977.167  When women were eventually al-
lowed into these professions, they were relegated to second-class status.  
For example, Los Angeles policewomen were barred from regular po-
lice patrol duty, generally performed “tasks relating to women and 
children, desk duty, and administration,” and were ineligible for pro-
motion above sergeant.168  Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
the obstacles faced by women in traditionally male professions; for ex-
ample, in United States v. Virginia, the Court noted that “women seek-
ing careers in policing [have] encountered resistance based on fears 
that their presence would . . . deprive male partners of adequate assis-
tance . . . . Field studies [do] not confirm these fears.”169 
While this historical discrimination is not in and of itself a factor in 
disparate impact analysis, it provides an essential context in which to 
explain subsequent actions taken by city employers and testmakers.  
Simply put, physical-selection procedures are often used in jobs where 
it is still a “man’s world,” and this correlation is not a coincidence.  
When an industry consists of an overwhelming majority of men, then 
men are more likely to be in hiring and supervisory positions, and—
 
166 See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1979) (ex-
plaining that the LAPD excluded entry-level policewomen from regular patrol work 
until 1973). 
167 Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. 177, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
168 Blake, 595 F.2d at 1371.   
169 518 U.S. 515, 544 (1996) (citing FRANCES HEIDENSOHN, WOMEN IN CONTROL?  
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 92-93, 184-85 (1992)).  
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consciously or subconsciously—they are more likely to base their 
standards of success around the manner in which men traditionally 
perform these jobs.170  They will likely be less understanding of how the 
job can be performed equally well in alternative manners.  Because of 
the lack of internal pressure to adapt, courts should examine male-
dominated occupations critically and vigilantly, looking out for deci-
sions made on the basis of unfounded assumptions.171 
Using this lens, courts will find much about which to be suspicious.  
In Berkman I, a proposed test that considered an applicant’s flexibility 
was rejected because the fire department wanted a test “for firefight-
ers, not for ballet dancers.”172  More recently, the employer in Lanning 
I and II hired a test developer who had previously been criticized by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia for his overtly stereotypi-
cal categorizations of women and the impact on all-male institutions if 
women were to be admitted.173  When asked rhetorically at a deposi-
 
170 See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 616-17 (6th Cir. 1980) (invalidating a test 
developed through an “intuitive process”); Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 
1214, 1249 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (rejecting “anecdotal evidence” as insufficient to validate 
a test), rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993).   
171 The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of including members of the 
group who are disparately excluded in studies that are used to validate tests.  See Albe-
marle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435-36 (1975) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5(b)(1), 
(b)(5) (1974)). 
172 Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. 177, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).   
173 The expert in question, Dr. Paul Davis, testified extensively on the point that be-
cause of physiological differences between men and women, “[f]emale cadets would 
not be able to perform the tasks in the [Virginia Military Institute (VMI)] rat training 
program at a level comparable to that of male cadets,” that women would reduce the 
“intensity and aggressiveness of the current program,” and that as a result, “[t]he pro-
gram’s benefit to the morale of male participants would be adversely affected.”  United 
States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1438 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th 
Cir. 1992), aff’d, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  When United States v. Virginia eventually reached 
the Supreme Court, the United States countered Davis’s testimony by arguing that 
“time and again since this Court’s turning point decision in Reed v. Reed, [this Court 
has] cautioned reviewing courts to take a ‘hard look’ at generalizations or ‘tendencies’ 
of the kind pressed by Virginia.”  518 U.S. at 541 (citation omitted).  The Court agreed, 
finding that   
[t]he notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI’s stature, destroy 
the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a judgment hardly 
proved, a prediction hardly different from other ‘self-fulfilling prophec[ies],’ 
once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities.  When women first sought 
admission to the bar and access to legal education, concerns of the same order 
were expressed. 
Id. at 542-43 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)); see also Charles J. Russo & Susan J. 
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tion if there were any physical activities in which women’s abilities ex-
ceeded those of men, Dr. Davis responded affirmatively—women are 
better, he allowed, at “having children and giving milk.”174 
Proving test-developer bias, or inadequate content analysis prior to 
the application of the test, cannot invalidate a test if the analysis per-
formed ex post ultimately substantiates the examination.  Neverthe-
less, understanding the context may support the argument that courts 
should examine these decisions more critically in light of the fact that 
test developers are likely not to have undertaken such analysis them-
selves.  As Judge O’Hern noted in his In re Vey dissent, when a woman 
is excluded from a traditionally “male” occupation, it should “give[] 
rise to concern whether a double standard is being invoked when such 
[facially neutral] traits are implemented to disqualify a woman from 
police duty.”175  It is important for the advocate to frame the litigation 
in a manner that brings context to the obstacles faced by female appli-
cants and the test results that subtly reflect such obstacles. 
B.  Appeal to the Factfinder’s Capacity to Dismiss Unfounded Stereotypes 
Secondly, it is important to identify concrete ways in which dis-
criminatory stereotypes hurt both female applicants and society in 
general.  Courts have positively received specific examples of female 
applicants who had failed a test, but ultimately proved to be skillful law 
enforcers.  In fact, the Sixth Circuit in Zamlen v. City of Cleveland ex-
pressed the possibility of overturning trial verdicts that exclude the 
testimony of female employees hired prior to the implementation of 
the selection procedure.176  Because these employees would have spo-
ken to the fact that the 1983 “physical performance examination [was] 
not representative of their actual duties,” the court found that their 
statements could have been “relevant to a central issue in this case—
the validity of the selection device.”177 
 
Scollay, All Male State-Funded Military Academies:  Anachronism or Necessary Anomaly?, 82 W. 
EDUC. L. REP. 1073, 1079 n.32 (1993) (questioning the validity of Davis’s study based on 
alleged methodological flaws). 
174 Brief for the United States as Appellant at 9 n.10, Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (Nos. 98-1644, 98-1755). 
175 639 A.2d 718, 719 (N.J. 1994) (O’Hern, J., dissenting).  Judge O’Hern explained 
that “[a]mong [the] traits that the employing authority deems disqualifying for police 
work are [being] bold, suspicious, and easily frustrated.”  Id. 
176 906 F.2d 209, 215-16 (6th Cir. 1990). 
177 Id. at 215.  However, the court did not overturn the verdict due to the exclusion 
of this testimony because similar evidence was entered by male firefighters testifying on 
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In Lanning I, the plaintiff produced the testimony of a SEPTA of-
ficer who had not passed the timed mile-and-a-half run but had been 
hired due to a clerical error.178  In its statement of the facts, the Third 
Circuit noted: 
This officer has subsequently been “decorated” by SEPTA and has been 
nominated repeatedly for awards such as Officer of the Year and Officer 
of the Quarter.  SEPTA has commended her for her outstanding perfor-
mance as a police officer and has chosen her to serve as one of SEPTA's 
two defensive tactics instructors.179 
A similar commendation was put forth in United States v. City of Erie, 
where the court contemplated the ability of female officers hired un-
der a previous standard that had allowed for more female hires.180  
Courts have proven receptive to the fact that officers can perform at 
exceptional levels despite having failed the selection procedure put 
forth by the employer. 
Courts have also responded positively to expert testimony critiquing 
the merits of tests.  In Brunet v. City of Columbus, female firefighters chal-
lenged a physical test that, inter alia, required applicants to climb and 
descend a five-story high ladder.181  The plaintiffs’ expert concluded that 
 
their behalf.  Id. at 216.  Nevertheless, the court made it a point to note that the exclu-
sion was “unfortunate” and, without the male firefighter’s testimony, would likely have 
been found to be prejudicial.  Id. 
178 181 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1999).  The Third Circuit noted, moreover, that 
“SEPTA has promoted incumbent officers who have failed . . . the physical fitness test,” 
and that “SEPTA has never disciplined, terminated, removed, reassigned, suspended or 
demoted any transit officer for failing to perform the physical requirements of the 
job”—all while women comprised only sixteen of its 234-member police force.  Id. 
179 Id. 
180 See 411 F. Supp. 2d 524, 566-67 (W.D. Pa. 2005).  As the court stated,  
[T]he majority (five) of the eight female officers currently on the City’s police 
force were hired before the City began using the [physical-agility test] in 
1994. . . .  
The City has presented no evidence that Detective Kemling or Detective 
Sergeant Mangan were ever unable to perform the physical tasks required by 
their jobs.  On the contrary, Detective Sergeant Mangan has been promoted 
twice and received a commendation for her police work.  Detective Kemling has 
been a field training officer and has been promoted to the rank of detective. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
181 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D. Ohio 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th 
Cir. 1993).  In Brunet, the city administered the ladder climb to two sets of firefighter 
applicants—one in 1980 and a second in 1984—and in those years respectively four 
and two females, but 105 and 124 males, eventually met the necessary requirements to 
become firefighters.  Id.  
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the test was a poor metric of endurance and agility.182  The court ex-
plained that “[t]he inevitable result of this narrowed focus upon 
strength is that relatively small differences in strength will tend to de-
termine whether an individual is selected as a firefighter.  There is no 
guarantee . . . that in selecting stronger individuals, individuals with 
greater endurance and agility are also being selected.”183  Finding that 
it was important for the test to cover the range of abilities necessary to 
perform a firefighter’s job, the court directed the city to redesign its 
test accordingly.184 
In fact, scholars have argued that advocates in race-based disparate 
impact cases should take note of the ability of claimants in gender-based 
cases to demonstrate that a discriminatory procedure hinders the accu-
racy of the test and therefore hurts the overall quality of employees.185  
Professor Helen Norton, for example, asserts that the Ricci decision 
stems from an assumption of a zero-sum state of equality—that “a deci-
sion maker’s concern for the disparities experienced by members of one 
racial group (‘empathy’) inevitably includes the intent to discriminate 
against others (‘prejudice’).”186  In order to rebut the notion of zero-sum 
equality, Professor Norton points to arguments used in Harless, Berkman, 
and other cases involving gender-based physical-selection procedures.187  
 
182 Id. at 1222. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 1222, 1250. 
185 Professor Ann McGinley argues that assessment centers may be “the preferable 
method[] of measuring job skills while simultaneously permitting cities to promote a 
[racially] diverse population.”  Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano:  A Masculinities 
Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 621 (2010).  But assessment centers may 
have a harmful effect on female applicants if the employer does not sufficiently control 
for the so-called “double bind” predicament.  Id.  The “double-bind” predicament was 
first introduced in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and refers to the fact that women who 
seek employment in a traditionally male occupation are criticized for their aggressive-
ness and thus placed “in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22:  out of a job if they 
behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.  Title VII lifts women out of this 
bind.”  490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion).  For example, Professor Madeline 
Heilman and her coauthors examined gender norms for women by having subjects 
review information about an employee they were told recently completed a training 
program.  The researchers found that “it is only women, not men, for whom a unique 
propensity toward dislike is created by success in a nontraditional work situation.”  
Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success:  Reactions to Women Who Succeed at Male 
Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416, 421, 426 (2004). 
186 Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Under-
standing of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 202 (2010). 
187 See id. at 255-56 (emphasizing that successful arguments have pointed to the lack 
of a “meaningful relationship” between physical-ability tests and actual job requirements). 
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Here, “attention to disparate impact spurred better hiring for key public 
safety positions.”188  Advocates in race-based cases may do well to learn 
from their gender-based counterparts in framing arguments to demon-
strate that disparate impact analysis protects “classes who may not be 
recognized as productive because of traditional yet unexamined as-
sumptions.”  In so doing, those advocates may ultimately produce a net 
social gain.189 
C.  Address Valid Safety Concerns by Providing  
Concrete Reasonable Alternatives 
Undoubtedly, there are valid public safety concerns at stake in 
public safety occupations.  Likewise, there are valid concerns, both 
fiscal and social, when proposing expansions of gender-based dispar-
ate impact claims.  It is important that advocates assuage these fears by 
demonstrating (1) that such changes have occurred elsewhere without 
adverse consequence to public safety and (2) that such an overhaul is 
not as drastic as it may at first appear. 
In many of the cases that have successfully invalidated selection-
procedure examinations, plaintiffs have been able to propose a reason-
able alternative, fulfilling the third prong of the traditional disparate 
impact analysis.190  In Blake v. City of Los Angeles, for example, the dis-
trict court found that the LAPD “could be so structured as to permit 
the employment of an equal percentage of male and female appli-
cants,” but that it “could not be required to adopt less discriminatory 
alternatives if they required modification of departmental policies.”191  
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “[s]o long as non-
discriminatory alternatives serve the legitimate interests of the police 
in safe and efficient job performance, police departments cannot pur-
sue policies that require the use of selection standards that are them-
selves prima facie violations of Title VII.”192 
 
188 Id. at 256. 
189 Id. at 259. 
190 See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding that alterna-
tive bases in the form of written intelligence exams existed for selecting police officers 
since these “tests did not have a statistically disparate impact between males and fe-
males”); EEOC v. Simpson Timber Co., No. 89-1455, 1992 WL 420897, at *4-5 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 7, 1992) (summarizing reasonable alternatives to the physical-abilities test 
used by the employer to select employees for logging and timber operations). 
191 595 F.2d 1367, 1383 (9th Cir. 1979). 
192 Id.  One reasonable alternative that is currently popular in firefighter cases is the 
Candidate Physical-Ability Test (CPAT).  For further information regarding the CPAT, 
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In contrast, a plaintiff’s failure to provide an alternative proposal 
can draw a rebuke from the court.  Recently, in United States v. Massachu-
setts, a federal district court considered the legality of Massachusetts’s 
eleven-event Caritas Physical-Abilities Test (PAT), which the State used 
to select correctional officers.193  Roughly ninety-seven percent of men 
but only fifty-five percent of women passed the PAT in 2007.194  How-
ever, the plaintiff did not provide a reasonable alternative for screen-
ing and selecting correctional officer applicants.  The court ultimately 
denied the Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment, but it 
explicitly inveighed against the United States’ choice not to provide a 
reasonable alternative: 
It is during trial of the third prong that the real heavy lifting would take 
place and the important Congressional purpose best could be achieved.  
The real question is not whether the Caritas PAT results in a disparate im-
pact on women (it does), nor is it whether the test is job related and im-
plemented to achieve public policy goals (we’ll see).  The real question is 
whether we can do better.  Can we achieve those same public policy goals 
and reduce or eliminate the disparate impact on women?  Trial of the 
third prong would have explored those important issues in a fair and nu-
anced manner with the goal of truly achieving equal economic opportunity 
for both men and women while, at the same time, achieving the Com-
monwealth’s significant public policy goals.   
Instead, the United States has reneged on its promise of evidence as to 
the third prong . . . .195  
Although Judge Young ultimately ruled against his original line of rea-
soning, it is clear from the opinion that his disdain for the govern-
ment’s failure to proffer an alternative remained.196 
Additionally, plaintiffs have had success in deflating public safety 
concerns by pointing to irregularities in a city’s physical-fitness standard.  
In Harless v. Duck, for instance, the Sixth Circuit relied in part on the 
 
see Roger Waters, CPAT Firefighter Physical Ability Test—What Is It and How to Prepare for 
It, EZINE @RTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?CPAT-Firefighter-Physical-Ability-Test---
What-Is-It-And-How-To-Prepare-For-It (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
193 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4, 9 (D. Mass. 2011). 
194 Id. at 9. 
195 Id. at 20-21. 
196 See id. at 13.  Indeed, Judge Young seemed to suggest that the third prong of the 
test was nearly the downfall of the litigation.  He noted, “[A]s the United States simply 
gave up on the third prong, I [originally] thought myself entitled to infer that it had 
nothing better to offer than a reversion to the disparate treatment of the [Common-
wealth’s previous] test . . . . On this record, I thought such an order [ordering the 
Commonwealth to develop a better alternative under federal court supervision] would 
contravene . . . congressional intent . . . .”  Id.   
Wu FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/11/2012 12:55 PM 
1236 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1195 
 
fact that the city had eliminated the physical-ability test from a more 
recent selection procedure with “apparently . . . no detrimental effect 
on the police department.”197  Similarly, in Blake, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the business necessity defense:  “The fact that the LAPD hired 
thousands of male police officers between 1968 and 1973 without us-
ing any pre-employment physical test suggests that the practice is not 
essential to safe and efficient job performance.”198   
Another argument that may be effective is to point out that in many 
instances applicants, once employed, are not required to pass physical 
examinations on a regular basis.  In Lanning I, for example, the Third 
Circuit noted that SEPTA tried to discipline incumbent officers who 
failed fitness tests but that it discontinued this practice due to protests 
by the officers’ union.199  A city advocating that “more is better” with 
regard to the physical fitness of the group as a whole might struggle to 
substantiate that claim if it allows law enforcement officers to regress 
after they are hired. 
D.  The Doctrine Shall Set You Free 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, successful advocates con-
sistently refer back to the disparate impact doctrine itself.  The beauty 
of this doctrine, as laid out in Griggs and subsequent Supreme Court 
case law, lies in its fundamental simplicity:  if the plaintiff proves that 
the defendant’s practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, 
that practice violates Title VII unless the defendant can prove that the 
practice is not based on stereotypical classifications but rather reflects 
an actual business necessity.200  If subsequent lower courts become 
mired in the details, it is helpful to remind them that such details may 
be inconsistent with the law as put forth by the Supreme Court.  The 
Court has made no mention of adequate applicant preparation, nor 
 
197 619 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1980). 
198 Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1382 (9th Cir. 1979). 
199 181 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1999).  As the court explained, “SEPTA has promoted 
incumbent officers who have failed some or all of the components of the physical fit-
ness test.  SEPTA has also given special recognition, commendations, and satisfactory 
performance evaluations to incumbent officers who have failed the physical fitness 
test.”  Id.  In Lanning II, the Third Circuit likewise found that “[t]here has been no 
showing . . . that fitness level at the time of application is a reliable proxy for fitness 
level on the job over the ensuing years,” and “SEPTA has promoted officers who failed 
the running test” as well as “extended [offers] as much as two and one-half years after 
the aerobic running test is administered.”  308 F.3d 286, 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2002). 
200 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
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public safety doctrine, nor any idea that “more is better.”  And it most 
certainly has not alluded to any doctrinal distinction between race-
based and gender-based disparate impact claims. 
Professor Michael Selmi has written, “The faith so many scholars 
and advocates have imbued in the disparate impact theory largely ig-
nores much of what we have learned about the way in which the law 
works to preserve social norms rather than to upend them.”201  I disa-
gree.  History has shown time and again that the relationship between 
the law and the progression of social norms is symbiotic, complex, and 
dynamic.  It is true that gender-based disparate impact case law as it cur-
rently stands is not as helpful as feminist advocates would like, but that 
does not mean that we should stop aiming for the ideal.  Indeed, the 
success of one subset of gender-based disparate impact cases, physical-
selection procedure cases, should give hope to advocates seeking to 
reclaim the ideals of Title VII. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court decided the landmark Dothard case,   
gender-based disparate impact causes of action have been limited in 
sphere and scope.  But there remains room for growth.  This Com-
ment’s examination of the case law surrounding physical-selection pro-
cedures reflects the challenges of a theory highly dependent on the 
factfinder’s ability to free herself from pervasive assumptions.  Female 
plaintiffs must combat unfounded assumptions and doctrinal nonstart-
ers both in establishing prima facie cases and in rebutting affirmative 
defenses.  They face failure-to-train claims and rallying cries of “more is 
better” and “strength is everything”—beliefs that are inconsistent with 
Griggs and other Supreme Court case law but which nevertheless persist. 
However, the success of physical-selection procedure cases also 
suggests that the expansion of the disparate impact cause of action is 
possible, so long as advocates adhere to certain basic principles in 
framing their arguments.  First, advocates must provide context for the 
problem at hand.  Second, advocates must recognize any persistent ste-
reotypes and make them palpable to the factfinder.  Third, advocates 
must address valid concerns by providing reasonable alternatives or 
other similar analogies.  Fourth, and most importantly, advocates must 
consistently tie arguments back to the Supreme Court doctrine and 
 
201 Selmi, supra note 75, at 707-08. 
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the congressional intent that framed it.  Physical-selection procedure 
advocates may confront a set of obstacles along the way, but advocates 
have and will continue to succeed.  Maintaining this subset of success-
ful litigation is pivotal not only to the gender-based disparate impact 
movement but also to the disparate impact movement overall. 
